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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Wally Kay Schultz appeals from the summary dismissal of his successive 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In separate underlying criminal cases, a jury convicted Schultz of felony 
domestic battery and he pied guilty to possession of a controlled substance. (R., 
p. 135.) The matters proceeded to joint sentencing and the district court retained 
jurisdiction. (Id.) On May 22, 2006 the district court entered an order placing 
Schultz on probation. (Id.) Three days later it entered an order setting the terms 
and conditions of probation. (Id.) 
Schultz's trial counsel filed a notice of appeal timely only from the second 
order. (R., p. 136.) The Idaho Court of Appeals ultimately dismissed this appeal 
as untimely. (Id.) The appellate court issued its remittitur on August 27, 2009. 
(Id.) 
While the appeal of the underlying criminal cases was pending, Schultz 
filed petitions for post-conviction relief related to both cases on January 13, 2009, 
and March 24, 2009, respectively. (R., p. 136.) He did not allege claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a timely appeal in either case, 
although he did unsuccessfully attempt to amend the petition to allege such a 
claim in one of them. (Id.) The district court appointed counsel to represent 
Schultz in both post-conviction cases. (Id.) The district court granted the state's 
motion to summarily dismiss the petitions on January 8, 2010. (R., p. 137.) The 
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Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on appeal on May 9, 2011, holding 
that the petitions were untimely because the untimely appeals in the criminal 
cases did not extend the time to file the post-conviction petitions. Schultz v. 
State, 151 Idaho 383, 256 P.3d 791 (Ct. App. 2011). 
On January 21, 2011, Schultz initiated the current case by filing a 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p. 1.) In the petition Schultz 
asserted claims that his post-conviction counsel had been ineffective by failing to 
secure affidavits and make arguments that, he asserted, would have led to 
application of a "[d]iscovery exception" and prevented the dismissal of his initial 
petitions for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 1-3.1) The relief he ultimately 
requested was to be "allowed to re-file his original Post-conviction Cases and 
argue against the State's Motion to Dismiss." (R., p. 99.) 
The state moved to dismiss the petition. (R., pp. 106-15.) In the motion 
the state argued that Schultz failed to show ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel because Schultz failed to establish that post-conviction 
counsel could have prevented the dismissal of the petitions. (R., p. 113.) 
Schultz responded, contending that post conviction counsel failed to discover 
evidence that counsel in his criminal case and appeal advised Schultz that his 
time for filing the initial petitions was not running, which information would have 
led to his initial petitions not being dismissed as untimely. (R., pp. 119-28.) 
1 Schultz was later allowed to amend his petition to assert a claim of newly 
discovered evidence regarding the state crime lab. (R., pp. 58-60, 76, 91-92, 95-
104.) Because Schultz does not challenge the dismissal of this claim on appeal 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3), it is not further addressed in this brief. 
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The district court granted the state's motion for summary dismissal, but on 
a ground other than asserted by the state. (R., pp. 135-45.) Specifically the 
district court held that because Schultz asserted only a claim of ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel, and no claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel, Schultz failed to set forth a viable claim for post-conviction relief. 
(R., pp. 139-41.) Schultz filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 147, 149-50.) 
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ISSUE 
Schultz states the issue on appeal as: 
Should the order summarily dismissing the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim be reversed because the district court 
dismissed on grounds not stated in the state's motion for summary 
dismissal without giving a 20-day notice and allowing Mr. Schultz to 
respond? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Schultz failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his 




Schultz Has Failed To Show That Dismissal Of His Successive Petition Was 
Improper 
This Court Should Affirm On The Grounds Asserted In The State's Motion 
For Summary Dismissal 
When the state files a motion for summary dismissal, setting forth 
adequate notice of the grounds for dismissal, and the court grants the state's 
motion for the reasons urged by the state, a post-conviction petitioner receives 
adequate notice of the grounds for dismissal. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 
159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). The district court cannot, however, 
"dismiss a claim on a ground not asserted by the state in its motion unless the 
court gives the twenty-day notice required by Section 19-4906(b)." DeRushe v. 
State, 146 Idaho 599, 602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009) (citing Saykhamchone v. 
State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995)). The purpose of the 20-
day notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) is to give the petitioner the 
opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence to establish a genuine 
issue of material fact. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1073, 
1074 (1991); State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487, 489, 632 P.2d 676, 678 
(1981); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 818, 892 P.2d 488, 493 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
Schultz correctly argues that the state moved to dismiss because Schultz 
failed to establish ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, but the 
district court dismissed for failure to state any claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel. Schultz therefore lacked notice of the grounds ultimately applied by 
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the district court for dismissal. Where the grounds for dismissal articulated by the 
district court are erroneous, however, the appellate court "must consider ... any 
alternative ground" set forth in the summary judgment motion and "affirm the 
district court if ... summary judgment on this cause of action would have been 
proper on an alternative basis that was presented below." Johnson v. McPhee, 
147 Idaho 455, 466, 210 P.3d 563, 574 (Ct. App. 2009); see also Schultz v. 
State, 153 Idaho 791, _, 291 P.3d 474, 480 (Ct. App. 2012) (affirming on 
ground different than trial court, but raised in state's motion to dismiss). Because 
the state's motion is meritorious, the district court's dismissal should be affirmed 
on that basis. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
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C. Schultz Failed To Set Forth A Prima Facie Claim That His Initial Petitions 
Were Dismissed Because Of The Ineffective Assistance Of Post-
Conviction Counsel 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be 
commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration 
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." In the 
case of successive petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid 
application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims 
which simply are not known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise 
important due process issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 
1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 
870, 874 (2007)). Because I.C. § 19-4908 contemplates successive petitions to 
assert a claim that "for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised," claims that "raise important due process issues" that were "not known to 
the defendant" within the one-year limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902(a) can be 
brought within a reasonable time of their discovery. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250-
51, 220 P.3d at 1069-70. Absent a showing by the petitioner that the limitation 
period should be tolled, the failure to timely file a petition for post-conviction relief 
- either within the one-year limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902 or within a 
reasonable time of the discovery of new claims - is a basis for dismissal of the 
petition. Rhoades, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066; Evensiosky v. State, 136 
Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 190, 219 P.3d 
1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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In this case the statute of limitations for filing for post-conviction relief ran 
one year and 42 days from May 22, 2006. See Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 
256 P.3d 791 (Ct. App. 2011) (untimely appeal did not extend time to file for post-
conviction). Thus, Schultz should have filed his initial petition on or before July 3, 
2007. Schultz filed his initial petitions on January 13, 2009 and March 24, 2009, 
respectively. (R., p. 136.) These petitions were dismissed as untimely brought. 
Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 256 P.3d 791 (Ct. App. 2011). Schultz, 
therefore, had the burden of establishing that ineffective assistance of his 
appellate counsel in defending against the statute of limitation defense was the 
reason his claims were dismissed as untimely. See I.C. § 19-4908; Charboneau 
v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). He failed to carry that 
burden. 
Initially, it is clear that post-conviction counsel appointed after the filing of 
the petitions was not responsible for the timing of the filing. Schultz's claim was 
that post-conviction counsel should have responded to the state's motion to 
dismiss the untimely petitions with affidavits or other evidence from the trial and 
appellate attorneys in the criminal case and by making certain legal arguments. 
(R., pp. 97-98.) The information Schultz believes his original post-conviction 
attorney should have presented included a letter from the bar association (R., p. 
97; see also R., pp. 5-9) and an affidavit from the appellate lawyer in the criminal 
case (R., p. 97; see also R., pp. 10-23). The argument counsel should have 
made, according to Schultz, was that trial counsel had a duty to file a timely 
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appeal and that Schultz was misled by the belief that a timely appeal had been 
filed. (R., pp. 97-98; see also R., pp. 24-26.) 
Schultz has failed to make a prima facie showing that his post-conviction 
counsel could have avoided the summary dismissal of his petitions. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals characterized Schultz's arguments against dismissal of the 
initial post-conviction petitions as follows: 
Schultz argues that the district court erred in determining 
that his post-conviction petitions are barred by the statute of 
limitation because Schultz received ineffective assistance of 
counsel when his counsel failed to file timely direct appeals, and 
because Schultz did not discover this untimely filing until, at the 
earliest, the State's response on direct appeal. These 
circumstances, Schultz argues, tolled the statute of limitation in his 
cases. He asserts that when appeals were taken in his two criminal 
cases, he had no way of knowing that this Court would ultimately 
conclude that the notices of appeal were invalid because they were 
filed three days late. Schultz maintains that because he had a 
good faith belief that his appeals were timely, absent tolling of the 
statute of limitation he will be deprived of a reasonable opportunity 
to present his claims, and therefore will be deprived of due process. 
Schultz, 151 Idaho at 386, 256 P.3d at 794. Applying existing Idaho authority, 
the Court of Appeals concluded "the statute of limitation on Schultz's properly 
pied post-conviction claims was not tolled," because the invalid appeal did not 
extend the time to file and Schultz "knew of the underlying facts giving rise to his 
claims." Id at 387, 256 P.3d at 795.2 
2 The Idaho Court of Appeals did not address whether tolling might have been 
applicable to a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file the 
notice of appeal, because such claim had not been pied. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 
387, 256 P.3d at 795. Schultz did not assert a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel in his successive petition, and in fact requested as relief the 
reinstatement of the prior petitions that did not include any claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to file a timely appeal. (R., p. 99 (requesting 
reinstatement of prior petitions in prayer for relief).) 
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Schultz failed to present a prima facie claim that post-conviction counsel 
could have prevented the dismissal of his untimely petitions. There was no 
tolling because the untimely notices of appeal did not toll the period to file and 
because Schultz was aware of the underlying facts supporting his claims. 
Schultz, 151 Idaho at 386-87, 256 P.3d at 794-95. Schultz presented no 
evidence that the notices of appeal were in fact timely filed, or that he was 
unaware of the underlying facts. His argument that he was "advised by counsel 
that his timeline for post-conviction was not running" (R., p. 122) fails because it 
was 2009 when he was first told he could file his post-conviction petition after his 
appeal (R., p. 13), well after the limitation period had run, and he in fact filed his 
petition (R., p. 136 (petition filed January 13, 2009)) before his appellate attorney 
advised him that his appeal might not be timely (R., pp. 18-19 (advising him of 
timeliness problem in February 11, 2009 letter)). The Court of Appeals already 
rejected his claim that his "mistaken belief that the law allowed him more time to 
file" tolled the limitation period. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 387, 256 P.3d at 795. 
Schultz did not present any claims or evidence that would call that holding into 
doubt. 
In this case the district court dismissed on a ground not asserted in the 
state's motion. However, the court's order may still be affirmed because the 
court could have granted the state's motion on the ground asserted. Because 
Schultz failed to show that his post-conviction counsel's handling of the statute of 
limitation issue had anything to do with the ultimate dismissal of the post-
conviction petitions as untimely, he failed to establish any basis for reinstating 
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those petitions. He has therefore failed to show any error in the summary 
dismissal of his successive petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Schultz's successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 11th day of March, 2013. 
KENNETH K. JORGEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
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